November 25, 2024

India facing more googlies on strategic pitch

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India, with her rising stature and desire to position herself as the ‘ultimate balancer’ and voice of the ‘Global South’, continues to face new challenges from neighbours China and Pakistan.

Having been deceived earlier, India is facing more googlies on the strategic pitch. It is important to read them correctly and devise a studied response.

Chinese conundrum

Chinese interlocutors reportedly generated confusing signals in the recent World Peace Forum organised in Beijing. Their messaging has a few important constituents and twists. The first is that they will like us to believe that Galwan fracas in 2020 was merely an accident. Even if we concede this for discussion’s sake, how does one explain use of barbaric weapons like tasers, barbed wire-encrusted maces, and rushing in of storm troopers? PLA seems to have pre-positioned special troops, and been equipped and prepared, for this accident. The so-called accident was after a series of orchestrated transgressions in Chumar and Demchok (2014); Depsang (2015), Pangong-Tso (2019-20) in EasternLadakh (EL), Naku La (2020), in Sikkim and more importantly 73-day stand-off in Doklam (2017).

What is even more perplexing is that accidents have continued after Galwan, as evidenced in the foiled PLA misadventure at Yangtze (Arunachal) in 2022.

It appears China set out on a calibrated revanchist course. This was in run-up to the 2021 centenary of CCP, in keeping with its affliction with chronological milestones.

PLA chose this time window based on its assessment of force and infrastructureasymmetry, as also control on escalation matrix. It has indeed crafted a unique muscular, coercive, kinetic strategy of salami-slicing without firefights. It is cognizant of the narrowing gap between the two nations, both in military power and infrastructure, more like ‘now or never’ moment, which propelled Pakistan to launch 1965 war.

However, she did underestimate Indian resilience, much like her iron brother.

The second twist is the rather obstinate reiteration that peace and tranquility prevail on border. There is not even a hint to revert to the status quo of 2019. The present arrangement of buffer zones and no patrolling regime suits PLA, as it has in effect achieved its claim line in EL.
Coupled with this, is the third spin, relegate border resolution to the backburner, euphemistically prescribed as situating these issues appropriately. It is a double-whammy as ambiguous LAC keeps revanchist avenues, open for Yangtze-like grab actions.

The final one, like the dreaded ‘China man’ delivery, isthat China is now open to considering a half-way solution. Experience suggests that this halfway starts in our half, as in all concessions have to be made by us.

The entire narrative fits into Mao’s strategy of Da-Da, Tan-Tan (fight-fight, talk-talk) repeated ad-infinitum, till the opponent gives up. The way ahead for us is to talk, but remain focused on capability building. Concurrently, it is important to declare unambiguously our understanding of LAC and drop the ambiguity built through the bogey of difference in perceptions. The key challenge is to make continued deployment in LAC sustainable and affordable.

All-weather connectivity to EL through Shinkula, coupled with localization of resources in vicinity is critical. The Sikkim model, where fresh vegetables and milk aresupplied by local co-operatives, needs to be tried out for EL, with the hub in Leh and the network extending to Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir.

It is easy for China to blame Indian tilt towards USA, but it conveniently ignores Indian reticence and hesitation in even joining the Quad.
PM Modi’s statement at the Shangri-La dialogue in 2018 and stress on SAGAR, security and growth for open and inclusive region. Our quest for Atam Nirbharta has to be smart, catalyzed by progressive decoupling and glocalisation.

The harsh reality is that addicted to cheaper Chinese products, our consumers are unwilling to sacrifice. More importantly, our primary sector cannot do without Chinese inputs.

USA is discovering this in frustration writ large, after failure of John Kerry, former vice president, climate action special envoy and US treasury secretary Janet Yellen, failing to get even audience with Xi Jinping and others. To rub it in, much is being made ofHenry Kissinger’s visit. Hence, coping up with China is going to be arduous and challenging. We have to cooperate and collaborate to a feasible extent, concurrently preparing for inevitable competition, contestation and confrontation.

Pak’s nuclear sabre rattling

Pakistan, ever ready to queer the pitch, has added another diabolic dimension in the seminar hosted by Institute of Strategic Studies.

Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, former DG of strategic plans division and current advisor to Nuclear Command Authority, injected the somewhat irrational concept of zero-range vector in vertical-response matrix.

The current array is Nasr (60 km) to Shaheen (2,750 km), covering Andaman Nicobar Islands, highlighting Indiacentric orientation.

He also reiterated full spectrum and triad-based profile in horizontal template. Unlike the single strategic forcescommand in India, Pakistan has separate ones for each service, albeit control being vested in the armed forces with just the veneer of political participation.

Zero range seems to be unprecedented and only known weapon was the discarded US M28/29 recoilless rifle system of 1950s.

Is Pakistan looking at nuclear mines and Chinese supplying nuclear torpedoes? It seems to be an attempt to deny space below the nuclear threshold, curated through the Balakot surgical strike. The worry is how will it be controlled in an army where corps commanders are part of a plot to orchestrate attack on their residences?

Our response can’t be kneejerk, yet we may need to call off the bluff again, this time with the zero-range twist. It will require honing of surgical response in target designation and zero-collateral damage to obviate irrational escalation.



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Disclaimer

Views expressed above are the author’s own.



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